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INTRODUCTION
“Shit, piss, cunt, fuck, cocksucker, motherfucker and tits:” the
seven dirty words that comedian George Carlin observed “you
couldn’t say on the public, ah, airwaves, um, the ones you definitely
1
wouldn’t say, ever.” Mr. Carlin may have been mistaken because the
Second Circuit recently gave broadcasters a victory in their battle
against broadcast indecency regulation. This Note analyzes the
validity of the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC” or
“Commission”) indecency regulations—specifically of fleeting
expletives—in light of the Second Circuit’s recent decision in Fox
2
Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC. In Fox Television, the court held that
the FCC’s inclusion of fleeting expletives in the category of actionably
indecent speech was an arbitrary and capricious departure from
3
precedent.
Although the Second Circuit ruled against the FCC, this Note
argues that fleeting expletives are constitutionally sanctionable under
current law and that the FCC was not acting arbitrarily in expanding
fining to single broadcast occurrences of indecent words. This Note
also addresses and distinguishes the broader criticisms of broadcast
indecency regulation, concluding that, although the constitutional
justifications for regulation are eroding, the fleeting expletive policy
is not the proper basis for reevaluating the FCC’s regulatory function.
Part I of this Note surveys the legal limitations on the FCC’s
authority to regulate indecent material. Part II describes the specific
1. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 751 (1978) (quoting GEORGE CARLIN,
Filthy Words, on OCCUPATION: FOOLE! (Eardrum Records 1973)).
2. 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007).
3. Id. at 462.
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broadcasts and Commission rulings leading up to the Fox Television
case. Parts III and IV analyze the Fox Television court’s disposition of
the case under arbitrary and capricious review, both in light of the
4
analogous 1988 case of Action For Children’s Television v. FCC, and
generally applicable bases for judicial reversal of agency action.
These Parts argue that the policy change was not arbitrary and
capricious because it was adequately reasoned and consistent with the
FCC’s authority. Further, Parts III and IV suggest that the Fox
Television court’s criticisms were not directed at the reasoning behind
the policy change, but at the broadcast indecency regulatory scheme
generally.
Part V examines the Fox Television court’s prediction, in dicta, that
the FCC’s indecency definition will be found unconstitutional. This
Part concludes that the inclusion of fleeting expletives is
constitutional under current law, falling squarely within the Supreme
Court’s approval of context-based broadcast speech restrictions.
Finally, this Note concludes that the Court should not use the Fox
Television case to revisit the broader justifications for regulation of
broadcast but should instead wait for a case that raises more
persuasive and timely arguments against the FCC’s continued
regulatory role.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. The FCC’s Statutory Authority
5

The FCC was established by the Communications Act of 1934 as a
6
regulatory agency for commerce in radio and wire communications.
From its inception, the FCC has been explicitly prohibited from
7
engaging in any censorship activity of the public airwaves. At the
same time, however, the FCC and broadcasters have been categorized
8
as “public trustees” charged with providing programming in the
4. 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
5. Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–
613 (2000)).
6. See id. (indicating that this measure would serve as a regulatory framework for
the communications industry).
7. See 47 U.S.C. § 326 (2000) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or
construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio
communications or . . . interfere with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication.”).
8. See, e.g., Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Inevitable Wasteland: Why the Public
Trustee Model of Broadcast Television Regulation Must Fail, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2101, 2103,
2105–08 (1997) (arguing that the FCC’s broadcast regulation schemes designed to
enforce broadcaster’s public interest obligations are constitutional but ineffective).
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9

public interest. One aspect of the public trustee model has been
regulation of speech deemed inappropriate for the viewing public,
10
most notably child viewers. In carrying out this duty of policing
11
speech, the FCC has relied on the public trustee doctrine, federal
criminal law prohibiting the broadcast of indecent, profane, or
12
obscene material, and authorization to enforce that federal law
13
through forfeiture penalties issued to broadcast licensees.
B. First Amendment Conflict
The Supreme Court has held that speech that qualifies as obscene
14
may permissibly be regulated in broadcast and other contexts.
Merely indecent speech (the category in which fleeting expletives
The essential justification for the limited First Amendment protection of broadcast—
and the FCC’s resulting power to regulate—was outlined in Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). There, the Court held that the “scarcity of broadcast,”
(i.e., the fact that “there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast
than there are frequencies to allocate”) justified government regulation. Id. at 388,
400–01.
9. See 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (2000) (providing that the FCC shall “generally
encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest”).
Additional contentious examples of public interest obligations are the fairness
doctrine and the obligation to provide children with quality educational
programming while protecting them from inappropriate content. See Anthony E.
Varona, Out of Thin Air: Using First Amendment Public Forum Analysis to Redeem American
Broadcasting Regulation, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 149, 159–65 (2006) (discussing the
fairness doctrine and suggesting that educational programming obligations are not
sufficiently defined or enforced). The FCC abolished the fairness doctrine in 1987.
See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (approving the
FCC’s abolition of fairness doctrine as neither arbitrary nor capricious).
10. See Anthony E. Varona, Changing Channels and Bridging Divides: The Failure
and Redemption of American Broadcast Television Regulation, 6 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1,
39–40 (2004) (recounting the FCC’s “strikingly permissive enforcement attitude” in
enforcing indecency and obscenity prior to the Commission decisions at issue in Fox
Television).
11. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 383 (approving classification of broadcast
frequencies as part of the “public trust”).
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000) (“Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or
profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.”).
13. See 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D) (2000) (making violators of 18 U.S.C. § 1464
liable to the U.S. government in forfeiture penalties). This provision is how the FCC
is technically authorized to administratively impose fines, revoke licenses, and issue
warnings for violations of its indecency regulations. See Sharokh Sheik, Comment,
FCC Indecency Violations: Should the FCC Be Able to Fine Non-Broadcast Licensees for
Indecency Violations?, 35 SW. U. L. REV. 457, 462 (2006) (noting that, although § 1464
is a criminal statute, “it has never been applied literally” and has instead been
enforced through civil fines).
14. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973) (reaffirming that the First
Amendment does not protect obscene material). The definition of obscenity at issue
in Miller was essentially material that “taken as a whole” appeals to the “prurient
interest.” Id. at 37 n.1 (Douglas, J., dissenting). The quintessential example of
obscenity, although only a “sub-group of all ‘obscene’ expression,” is pornography.
Id. at 20 n.2 (majority opinion).

2008]

ARBITRARY AND F^@#S*! CAPRICIOUS

727

fall), however, is fully protected by the First Amendment outside of
15
An inherent conflict therefore exists
the broadcast context.
between the FCC’s goal of regulating broadcasters as public trustees
16
and the First Amendment limitation on what speech the
17
Regulation of indecent
government may permissibly regulate.
18
speech is a problematic area where the FCC treads a fine line
between impermissible censorship and protecting the public
19
interest. Adding to the complexity is the pressure felt by the FCC
20
from the broadcast industry it regulates, Congress, and the public.

15. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (holding that display of
the word “fuck” in a public space is protected by the First Amendment).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”).
17. See, e.g., Krotoszynski, supra note 8, at 2123 (noting that the First Amendment
is at odds with the FCC’s duty to require broadcasters to fulfill their obligations as
public trustees but concluding that regulation of broadcast speech is likely
constitutional); see also Robert Corn-Revere, Can Broadcast Indecency Regulations Be
Extended to Cable Television and Satellite Radio?, 30 S. ILL. U. L.J. 243, 249–71 (2006)
(surveying attempts to regulate non-broadcast media such as cable and Internet and
predicting that any future attempts “would be almost certain to fail a constitutional
challenge”).
18. Even the FCC has acknowledged that the First Amendment’s protection of
indecent speech requires the government to “both identify a compelling interest for
any regulation it may impose on indecent speech and choose the least restrictive
means to further that interest,” which is the standard articulation of constitutional
strict scrutiny. Industry Guidance on Commission’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency (2001 Enforcement
Policies), 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 8000 (2001) (internal quotations omitted).
19. The problem actually concerns the potential self-censorship that results from
the threat of fines rather than literal government censorship of speech, as the FCC
does not actually prohibit indecent speech, but rather, levies fines after the fact. See,
e.g., Noelle Coates, Note, The Fear Factor: How FCC Fines are Chilling Free Speech, 14 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 775, 780–82 (2005) (highlighting the danger that broadcasters,
through self-censorship, will become “the functional equivalent of a government
censor”). See generally Sheik, supra note 13, at 463 (describing the FCC’s indecency
complaint enforcement process).
20. The public is overwhelmingly represented by a select few activist groups who
file the majority of complaints. See Geoffrey Rosenblat, Stern Penalties: How the Federal
Communications Commission and Congress Look To Crack Down on Indecent Broadcasting,
13 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 167, 173–75 (2006) (noting that FCC enforcement
procedures allow “watchdogs, activist groups and individuals” to target certain
broadcasters). This calls into question how representative the complaint process is of
public opinion. See Coates, supra note 19, at 789 (noting the influence of interest
groups on the regulatory process); see also B. Chad Bungard, Indecent Exposure: An
Economic Approach to Removing the Boob From the Tube, 13 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 187, 194
(2006) (labeling FCC enforcement methods an “applause test”). The FCC does not
monitor indecency (or related) violations, but rather, relies on a complaint process
whereby viewers’ complaints may be investigated to determine if a violation
occurred. 2001 Enforcement Policies, 16 F.C.C.R. at 8015. At least one watchdog group
makes what is effectively one-click reporting to the FCC possible through its website.
See Parents Television Council, File an Official Indecency Complaint With the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Now, https://www.parentstv.org/PTC/
fcc/fcccomplaint.asp (last visited Nov. 12, 2007) (providing a simple form which
submits a complaint directly to the FCC).
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Nevertheless, the FCC continues to navigate this complex area,
21
imposing fines on broadcasters who violate its rules.
C. The Pacifica Framework: The Court Permits Context-Based Restrictions
on Indecent Broadcast Speech
22

In the landmark case of FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Supreme
Court outlined the standard for indecency regulation that still serves
as the framework today. In Pacifica, the Court was confronted with
FCC regulation of a radio broadcast of comedian George Carlin’s
23
“Seven Filthy Words” monologue. The speech at issue was Carlin’s
use of seven curse words that did not qualify as unprotected obscene
24
speech. The Court nevertheless held that the FCC may regulate
indecent speech in broadcast, even when it is not obscene, because of
25
the unique characteristics of the broadcast medium.
The two
special features of broadcast identified by the Court were that
broadcast was a “uniquely pervasive” medium, capable of invading the
privacy of the home, and that broadcast was “uniquely accessible to
26
children.”
Finding that these concerns warranted broadcast
27
receiving “the most limited First Amendment protection,” the Court
28
applied “less than strict scrutiny” and held that the FCC could
21. For a chart summarizing the FCC’s indecency fining activity from 1970
through 2004, see Frank Ahrens, FCC Indecency Fines, 1970–2004,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/graphics/
web-fcc970.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2008).
22. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
23. Id. at 729. For a full transcript of the monologue, see id. at 751–55.
24. Id. at 750.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 748–50.
27. See Id. at 748 (distinguishing the historically limited protection of broadcast
speech from protected print speech and noting that “each medium of expression
presents special First Amendment problems”); cf. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343
U.S. 495, 502–03 (1952) (holding that motion pictures are protected speech under
the First Amendment but cautioning that the protection is not an “absolute freedom
to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all places”).
28. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 852 (E.D. Pa. 1996)
(discussing Pacifica’s lowered scrutiny of speech restrictions in broadcast and
concluding that strict scrutiny applies to Internet context regulations), aff’d, 521 U.S.
844 (1997). Strict scrutiny is typically applied to content-based regulations of speech
and requires that laws “be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government
interest.” United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
The Pacifica Court did not explicitly adopt a standard of review for broadcast
regulations nor did it conduct the typical balancing test between governmental
interests and the means of achieving them.
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748–50.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the Court approved the governmental interest in
protecting children and deemed regulation of broadcast speech an acceptable way to
achieve that goal at least in the specific circumstances of that case. See id. at 749-50
(citing Ginsburg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) for the proposition that the goal
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constitutionally regulate indecent speech like the Carlin monologue
29
under a context-based standard. The Court explicitly cautioned,
however, that they were not holding that an “occasional expletive . . .
would justify any sanction” and that the context of the speech was
30
“all-important.”
D. From Pacifica to 2003: The FCC Expands Indecency Regulation While
Exempting Fleeting Expletives
In the years following Pacifica, the FCC pursued a lax enforcement
policy of indecent speech, limiting actionable indecency to the seven
31
dirty words in the Carlin monologue.
In 1987, however, the
Commission announced that indecency determinations would be
made without regard to whether they contained one of the seven
words at issue in Pacifica and instead would be evaluated under the
32
generalized contextual test that remains in place today.
The
contextual definition adopted was virtually identical to the test at the
time of the Pacifica case: “‘language that describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs, when
33
there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.’”
The Commission successfully defended this indecency definition
34
against constitutional challenges in 1988, with the approving court
of enabling parents to control the content to which their children are exposed, when
combined with the ease of access to such content, “amply justif[ies] special treatment
of indecent broadcasting”).
29. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 (specifying that the content of a broadcast
program will “affect the composition of the audience” and that the Commission’s
approach to indecency determinations “requires consideration of a host of
variables”).
30. See id. (emphasizing the narrowness of the holding and explicitly not
deciding that an “occasional expletive” in the setting of a “two-way radio
conversation . . . or a telecast of an Elizabethan comedy” would be actionable
indecency). The Court also made clear that it had not decided whether regulation
would be permissible late at night when audiences contain “so few children.” Id. at
750 n.28.
31. See generally Brian J. Rooder, Note, Broadcast Indecency Regulation in the Era of
the “Wardrobe Malfunction”: Has the FCC Grown Too Big For its Britches?, 74 FORDHAM L.
REV. 871, 882–83 (2005) (describing relaxed FCC indecency regulation between
Pacifica and 1987 when the FCC adopted their current contextual approach).
32. See Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa. (1987 Reconsideration Order), 3 F.C.C.R. 930,
930 (1987) (indicating that there previously had been an “[u]nstated, but widely
assumed” presumption that only the language of the Carlin monologue, presented in
a deliberately shocking manner, would be actionable and abandoning that
presumption in favor of the “more difficult” contextual approach).
33. See id. (reiterating the indecency definition at issue in Pacifica and assuming
that the Court had implicitly agreed with its constitutionality).
34. See Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (Act I), 852 F.2d 1332, 1338–39
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (concluding that the FCC’s definition of indecency was not
unconstitutionally vague and finding support in Pacifica’s holding which quoted parts
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issuing a caveat that the FCC’s enforcement decisions remain
reasonable and not create an impermissible chilling effect on free
35
speech.
The Commission eventually settled on a policy where indecency
could be sanctioned under the aforementioned test during a 6 a.m.
to 10 p.m. “safe harbor” period during which children were
36
presumptively in the audience. Until the forfeitures at issue in Fox
Television, however, the FCC considered “deliberate and repetitive
use” of offensive words to be a prerequisite for finding them
actionable when the words were mere expletives not describing
37
sexual or excretory functions.
Because of uncertainty among broadcasters regarding what speech
was actionable, the FCC attempted to clarify its indecency standards
38
in a 2001 Policy Statement.
The Policy Statement announced
several factors to be considered in determining if speech was
“patently offensive,” which included:
(1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description or depiction
of sexual or excretory organs or activities; (2) whether the material
dwells on or repeats at length descriptions of sexual or excretory

of the indecency definition with “seeming approval”)), overruled in part by Action for
Children’s Television v. FCC (Act III), 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
35. Id. at 1340 n.14 (citing Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 761 (Powell, J., concurring)).
Again in 1991, see Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (Act II), 932 F.2d 1504,
1508 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (rejecting vagueness and overbreadth challenges to the
indecency definition), and 1995, see Act III, 58 F.3d at 659 (noting that petitioners
had “failed to provide any convincing reasons” to ignore precedent and declining to
overrule prior decisions upholding the indecency definition), the indecency
definition was attacked as unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, and both times the
challenges were dismissed on grounds that the definition had been implicitly
approved as constitutional by the Pacifica Court.
36. See Act III, 58 F.3d at 664–67, 670 (balancing the First Amendment rights of
adults to see and hear indecent broadcast material with the government’s
“compelling interest” in protecting children from such content and requiring the
FCC to confine its ban on indecent programming to between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00
p.m.).
37. See Pacifica Foundation Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, 2699 (1987)
([W]e believe that under the legal standards set forth in Pacifica, deliberate
and repetitive use in a patently offensive manner is a requisite to a finding of
indecency. When a complaint goes beyond the use of expletives, however,
repetition of specific words or phrases is not necessarily an element critical
to a determination of indecency. Rather, speech involving the description or
depiction of sexual or excretory functions must be examined in context to
determine whether it is patently offensive under contemporary community
standards applicable to the broadcast medium. The mere fact that specific
words or phrases are not repeated does not mandate a finding that material
that is otherwise patently offensive to the broadcast medium is not
indecent.).
38. Industry Guidance on Commission’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464
and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency (2001 Enforcement Policies),
16 F.C.C.R. 7999 (2001).
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organs or activities; (3) whether the material appears to pander or is used
to titillate, or whether the material appears to have been presented for its
39
shock value.

The FCC also noted in reference to fleeting expletives that,
[r]epetition of and persistent focus on sexual or excretory material
have been cited consistently as factors that exacerbate the potential
offensiveness of broadcasts . . . [but] where sexual or excretory
references have been made once or have been passing or fleeting
in nature, this characteristic has tended to weigh against a finding
40
of indecency.

That policy was soon to change.
II. CHANGES IN THE AIR . . . WAVES
A. The Golden Globes Decision
Beginning in 2003, several highly publicized incidents of expletives
41
aired on broadcast television prompting the FCC to change its long42
standing policy that fleeting expletives did not warrant sanction.
During the 2003 live broadcast of the Golden Globe Awards, Bono, a
singer in the popular band U2, upon winning an award for best
original song, exclaimed in delight, “this is really, really fucking
43
44
brilliant.” After receiving “hundreds of complaints” that the “Fword” was obscene and indecent, the FCC Enforcement Bureau
initially ruled that the word, because of its fleeting use and context
(i.e., as an intensifier, rather than a sexual description), was not

39. Id. at 8003. The Commission also stressed in the statement that the “full
context” of the speech is to be considered and that indecency determinations are
made on a “highly fact-specific” basis. Id. at 8002.
40. Id. at 8009. It is critical to note that this statement was not phrased as an
absolute requirement of repetition. See id. (“[E]ven relatively fleeting references may
be found indecent where other factors contribute to a finding of patent
offensiveness. Examples of such factors . . . include broadcasting references to sexual
activities with children and airing material that, although fleeting, is graphic or
explicit.”).
41. See, e.g., Julie Hilden, Bono, Nicole Richie, and the F-word: Broadcast Indecency
Law, CNN.COM, Dec. 23, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/12/23/findlaw.an
alysis.hilden.indecency/index.html?iref=newssearch (remarking that the incidents
“fueled a furor among Congress and concerned parents”).
42. See Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing
of the “Golden Globe Awards” Program (Golden Globes Complaint), 19 F.C.C.R. 4975,
4978–80 (2004) (“While prior Commission and staff action have indicated that
isolated or fleeting broadcasts of the ‘F-word’ such as that here are not indecent or
would not be acted upon, consistent with our decision today we conclude that any
such interpretation is no longer good law.”).
43. Id. at 4976 n.4.
44. Id.
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actionable indecency. Under pressure from Congress, however,
47
the FCC reversed the Enforcement Bureau’s decision and decided
that, “given the core meaning of the ‘F-Word,’ any use of that word or
a variation, in any context, inherently has a sexual connotation, and
48
therefore falls within the first prong of our indecency definition.”
The Commission then concluded that Bono’s specific use of the “Fword,” despite its lack of repetition, met its definition of patently
offensive under contemporary community standards for the
49
broadcast medium, and put broadcasters on notice that they would
be subject to forfeiture penalties in the future for even fleeting
50
expletives such as the Bono incident.
This decision changed the treatment of single expletives because,
depending on the expletive, they were now presumed to be sexual or
excretory references and thus within the first prong of the indecency
51
definition. After the distinction between expletives and sexual or
excretory references was dismissed as “artificial,” the “F-word” and “Sword” were placed into the category of language for which repetition
had arguably never been required in order to make a determination
of patent offensiveness, thereby allowing them to satisfy both prongs
52
of the indecency analysis.
45. See Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding their Airing of
the “Golden Globes Awards” Program (Enforcement Bureau Golden Globes), 18 F.C.C.R.
19859, 19861 (2003) (noting that the word “fuck” in the Bono context was fleeting
and did not describe sexual or excretory activity or organs, but rather was used as an
“adjective or expletive”).
46. See H.R. Res. 500, 108th Cong. (2004) (“[T]he Federal Communications
Commission should make every reasonable and lawful effort and use all of its
available authority to protect children from the degrading influences of indecent
and profane programming.”); S. Res. 283, 108th Cong. (2003) (resolving that the
FCC should reverse the finding of no indecency violation in the Golden Globes
complaint and heighten enforcement of decency standards).
47. See Golden Globes Complaint, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4982 (explaining the holding and
indicating that the decision is consistent with Pacifica).
48. Id. at 4978.
49. Id. at 4979.
50. Id. at 4982. The Commission also held that the word “fuck” was, in addition
to being indecent, “profane” under 18 U.S.C. § 1464. Id. at 4981. In making this
determination, the FCC departed from previous definitions of profane which
referred only to blasphemous language, and instead adopted the standard that
“‘vulgar, irreverent, or coarse language’” now constituted profanity. Id. (quoting
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1210 (6th ed. 1990)). The new profanity standard presents
a different set of issues and is beyond the scope of this Note.
51. See id. at 4978 (acknowledging but dismissing broadcasters’ argument that
the “F-word” in the Bono context was an “intensifier” and did not have a sexual
meaning); see also In re. Pacifica Found., Inc., 2 F.C.C.R. 2698, 2699 (1987)
(distinguishing between the use of “expletives” and descriptions of sexual or
excretory functions).
52. See Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2,
2002 and March 8, 2005 (Golden Globes Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13308
(2006), vacated by Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007)
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B. The Facts of Fox Television: The 2002 & 2003 Billboard Music
Awards
Following the Golden Globes decision, the FCC issued an Omnibus
Order attempting to clarify and provide guidance to broadcasters
53
through indecency determinations on various incidents. Among the
incidents addressed were the 2002 and 2003 Billboard Music Awards
in which Cher and Nicole Richie, in respective years, each used a
variant of the word “fuck” and Richie said “shit” in reference to cow
54
excrement in her reality show, “The Simple Life.” The Commission,
relying on the new fleeting expletive policy announced in the Golden
Globes decision, found each to be indecent but declined to issue
forfeitures because the new policy had not been announced at the
55
time of the broadcasts.
Fox and CBS sought review of the Omnibus Order in the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit and, after a remand to the FCC, who
56
affirmed its rulings on both Billboard Music Awards incidents, the
57
case was reinstated in the Second Circuit. The issue on appeal was
(arguing that “Bureau-level decisions issued before Golden Globe had suggested that
expletives had to be repeated to be indecent but descriptions or depictions of sexual
or excretory functions did not need to be repeated to be indecent” (internal
quotations omitted)). The FCC actually altered both parts of its indecency test.
First, it allowed mere expletives to be considered sexual or excretory references, thus
permitting “fuck” to satisfy the first prong. See id. at 13304 (“Given the core meaning
of the ‘F-Word,’ any use of that word has a sexual connotation.”). Second, it
dispensed with the requirement that material be repeated to be considered patently
offensive. Id. at 13305–08. Although the distinctions between the first and second
prong of the test tend to be blurred, the blurring has no consequence for the
purposes of this Note because the FCC’s test, despite attempts at separating it into
two distinct parts, remains a contextual determination of indecency.
53. See Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between February 2,
2002 and March 8, 2005 (Omnibus Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 2664, 2665 (2006), modified by
Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 2002 and
March 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299 (2006) (addressing the “increasing public unease
with the nature of broadcast material” and responding to broadcasters’ uncertainty
about the indecency standard’s application by applying the indecency test to a
“broad range of factual patterns” to “provide substantial guidance”).
54. See id. at 2692–95 (providing an overview of Nicole Richie’s use of expletives
and the ensuing legal action).
55. See id. (noting that Fox did not take appropriate steps to prevent the
utterance of expletives, but declining to impose any sanctions due to standing
“precedent”); see also Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 204 (1988)
(deciding that agencies may not issue rules with retroactive effect unless their
statutory rulemaking authority explicitly delegates such retroactive power).
56. See Golden Globes Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13311–13, 13325 (looking to
Nicole Richie’s reputation for such remarks as a factor in holding a broadcaster
liable and further explaining that Cher’s use of an expletive during prime time
television, coupled with the lack of advance notice from broadcasters to viewers,
rendered the act offensive).
57. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 454 (2d Cir. 2007)
(providing a synopsis of the discussion portion of the court’s opinion). CBS and
NBC intervened in the case despite the fact that the FCC had reversed its indecency
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the validity of the fleeting expletive policy with respect to only the two
Billboard Music Awards incidents, but the court seized the
opportunity to review the policy rather than the individual
decisions—although not with the finality that broadcasters would
58
have hoped.
III. PREVIOUS COURT TREATMENT OF THE FCC’S INDECENCY POLICY
UNDER ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS REVIEW.
A. Brief Overview of Judicial Review Under the
Administrative Procedure Act
Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, courts may set aside
agency decisions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion
59
or not in accordance with law.” According to the Supreme Court,
the factors making an agency decision arbitrary and capricious
include failing to consider crucial aspects of the problem, offering
explanations at odds with the relevant evidence, or offering
implausible solutions that cannot be explained by agency expertise or
60
a difference of opinion. In total, the standard can be summarized,
albeit vaguely, as requiring the agency to put forth a “satisfactory
61
explanation” for the challenged action.
In guiding the level of review under this standard, the Court has
said that reviewing courts should “uphold a decision of less than ideal
62
clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Despite
63
some disagreement and uncertainty, it is also generally agreed that

determinations against their shows N.Y.P.D. Blue (dismissed on procedural grounds)
and The Early Show (reversed due to context being a “bona fide news interview”). Id.
at 453–54.
58. See id. at 454 (“[T]he validity of the new ‘fleeting expletive’ policy announced
in Golden Globes and applied in the Remand Order is a question properly before us
on this petition for review.”). In holding the policy to be arbitrary and capricious
rather than unconstitutional, the court left open the possibility of the FCC resuming
the identical scheme after bolstering their reasoning on remand. See Fox Television,
489 F.3d at 462 (“[W]e doubt that the Networks will refrain from further litigation
on these precise issues if, on remand, the Commission merely provides further
explanation with no other changes to its policy.”).
59. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000).
60. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983).
61. Id.
62. See id. (quoting Bowman Transp. Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S.
281, 286 (1974)).
63. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416
(1971) (describing arbitrary and capricious review as “searching and careful”). See
generally Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership Between
Courts and Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221 (1996) (recounting the fluctuating
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“[t]he scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is
narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the
64
agency.”
The level of scrutiny under the arbitrary and capricious standard is
65
controversial, and it has been suggested that arbitrariness review is
similar, if not identical, to the second prong of agency review under
66
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council.
In the
absence of clear statutory language, Chevron requires the
determination of whether an agency construction of their statutory
67
mandate is reasonable.
Chevron has also come to stand for the
proposition—known as Chevron deference—that courts should defer
to reasonable or permissible agency constructions of unclear
68
statutes.
A detailed examination of the debate regarding the overlap
between Chevron step two and arbitrary and capricious review is
69
outside the scope of this discussion, but this Note will proceed
70
under the assumption that under either Chevron reasonableness or

levels of judicial review under the APA and highlighting key areas of academic
debate on the subject).
64. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
65. See generally Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and
Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1080
(1995) (discussing the scope of review under substantive review doctrines and
concluding that Congress should create more specific guidelines to reduce
“outcome-oriented behavior by judges”).
66. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
67. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 864–65; Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron:
Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253, 1295–97 (1997) (arguing that
Chevron step two and arbitrary and capricious review should be considered identical).
68. See generally A GUIDE TO JUDICIAL AND POLITICAL REVIEW OF FEDERAL AGENCIES
85 (John F. Duffy & Michael Herz eds., ABA 2005) [hereinafter JUDICIAL REVIEW].
The Fox Television court did not explicitly apply Chevron deference to the FCC’s policy
change, but nevertheless cited it for the proposition that “agencies are of course free
to revise their rules and policies.” Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444,
456 (2007). One potential explanation for the lack of specific Chevron deference is
that the FCC’s indecency definition is technically an interpretation of the federal
statute criminalizing indecent broadcast speech rather than an interpretation of an
explicitly FCC-administered statute. See JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra, at 113 (explaining
that Chevron applies only to statutory conferrals of authority where “Congress would
expect the agency to speak with the force of law” in interpreting the statute).
Although an argument could be made that Chevron should apply because the FCC is
specifically authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D) to enforce 18 U.S.C. § 1464
(criminalizing broadcast indecency) through forfeitures, this Note assumes that the
level of deference should be similarly high under arbitrary and capricious review,
which renders the issue superfluous.
69. For a detailed examination of this topic, see Levin, supra note 67.
70. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863–66. As noted above, the Fox Television court did
not claim to apply Chevron deference, but cited it in reference to agency deference.
See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 456.
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71

arbitrary and capricious review, at least some deference should be
72
The unclear standards for
afforded to agency interpretations.
exactly what is necessary to find an agency’s explanation of its choices
73
to be arbitrary have led to a steady stream of criticism. That
criticism expresses the view that many judicial decisions are the
product of mere disagreement with the agency’s outcome rather than
a truly impermissible flaw in the agency’s decision-making process or
74
authority. The lack of deference given by the court to the FCC in
75
Fox Television is an example of such an activist judicial attitude.
B. Comparison of Judicial Review in Fox Television with Action for
Children’s Television v. FCC
The Fox Television court erred in holding the FCC’s new policy on
fleeting expletives to be arbitrary and capricious and overreached the
appropriate standard of review, consequently substituting its
judgment for that of the agency. Considering the variability with
76
which arbitrary and capricious review has been applied, however,
71. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 41–45 (developing the guidelines for arbitrary and capricious review that
currently guide courts).
72. But see Wald, supra note 63, at 244–45 (“The rule in our [D.C.] circuit, as
elsewhere, is that Chevron deference gets trumped by the canon requiring avoidance
of unnecessary constitutional determinations. Consequently, we do not ordinarily
defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute if that interpretation raises a serious
constitutional question that another interpretation might avoid.”). However, the
author also argues that the “mere fact” that an agency makes policy determinations
that carry constitutional implications should not counsel courts to abandon
deference unless the agency’s interpretation raises a “concrete and avoidable
constitutional question.” Id. at 246. Such a rule of constitutional avoidance probably
represents the best argument in support of the lack of deference displayed by the Fox
Television court. However, as argued infra Part V, the fleeting expletives policy did
not raise any new constitutional questions in and of itself. Therefore, the court
could have deferred to the FCC on the fleeting expletive policy without addressing
any avoidable constitutional questions.
73. See, e.g., Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co. v. EPA, 8 F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cir. 1993)(“The
‘arbitrary or capricious’ concept, needless to say, is not easy to encapsulate in a single
list of rubrics because it embraces a myriad of possible faults and depends heavily
upon the circumstances of the case.”).
74. See generally Wald, supra note 63, at 234 (“The acknowledged impossibility of
specifying the components of ‘adequate explanation’ inevitably leaves courts open to
the charge that the results of our review are inconsistent and reflect the political or
philosophical preferences of the judges on the panel rather than any objective
standard.”).
75. See, e.g., Shapiro, supra note 65, at 1067 (arguing that the “relatively
indeterminate” definition of arbitrary and capricious combined with the
“manipulable categories to which different degrees of deference apply” creates an
environment where judges are “freer to pursue an outcome orientation”).
76. See JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 68, at 177–81 (discussing the debate over the
proper level of arbitrary and capricious review and noting that proponents of
minimal review emphasize that courts should not substitute their judgment for the
agency’s, while advocates of stringent or “hard look” review argue that a higher
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77

the decision was not blatantly erroneous. Nevertheless, the court
gave substantially less deference to the FCC’s new policy
determination than has been given in the past to FCC constructions
of its indecency regulating duties.
The most clearly analogous arbitrary and capricious challenge to
an FCC indecency construction was entertained in 1988 regarding a
major shift in the FCC’s standard for indecency determinations. In
78
Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (Act I), the FCC defended their
1987 decision to adopt the current contextual standard for indecency
rather than using George Carlin’s seven dirty words as their effective
79
“yardstick for ‘indecency,’” as they had done from Pacifica until
80
81
1987. This expansion was not insignificant. Judge (now Justice)
Ginsburg, writing for the D.C. Court of Appeals, accepted the FCC’s
explanation for the change in course and held that the expansion
82
was not an arbitrary and capricious agency action.
In Act I, the FCC’s justification for moving beyond regulating only
the seven Carlin words was that such an interpretation of indecency
83
was “unduly narrow as a matter of law” and inconsistent with its
enforcement duties. The FCC determined that the Carlin standard
essentially gave blanket permission to broadcasters to air offensive
material as long as it was not one of seven prohibited words, repeated
84
at length. Without much discussion, the court found the FCC’s
explanation adequate to defeat a claim that the change in standard

standard reduces the risk that agency decisions will be based on impermissible
political considerations); see also text and notes supra Part III.A (surveying the debate
over substantive review doctrines).
77. See Shapiro, supra note 65, at 1065–66 (labeling the arbitrary and capricious
standard “open-ended” and pointing to examples of the Court’s “conflicting
messages concerning the appropriate level of deference”).
78. 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988), overruled in part by Action for Children’s
Television v. FCC (Act III), 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
79. See id. at 1336, 1337–38 (recalling that, prior to the change, sanctionable
material had to be “similar or identical” to the George Carlin monologue); see also
Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa. (1987 Reconsideration Order), 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 930 (1987)
(“Unstated, but widely assumed . . . was the belief that only material that closely
resembled the George Carlin monologue would satisfy the indecency test articulated
by the FCC in 1975.”).
80. See 1987 Reconsideration Order, 3 F.C.C.R. at 930 (noting that the FCC took no
indecency action against broadcasters from 1975 until 1987).
81. See Act I, 852 F.2d at 1338. The change in indecency policy at issue in Act I
was a major leap from regulating only seven words to regulating indecency in
general, which includes visual depictions as well as audio.
82. See id. at 1338.
83. 1987 Reconsideration Order, 3 F.C.C.R. at 930.
84. Id. The FCC also acknowledged that a contextual standard would be the
“more difficult approach,” but would aid in curing the “anomalous [sic] result[]”
that children could be exposed to indecent material “simply because [broadcasters]
avoided certain words.” Id.
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85

was arbitrary and capricious. The court noted that, short of a brightline test that identified only seven repeated words as indecent, the
FCC would need a more “expansive” definition and the parties had
86
suggested no “tighter” formulation.
Instead of reading the FCC’s authority as limited to the precise
factual situation of Pacifica, the court implicitly agreed that the broad
definition of indecency, rather than the specific circumstances of the
Carlin monologue, was the proper scope of FCC’s authority after
87
The court also agreed, or at least did not find a fatal
Pacifica.
reasoning flaw, with the FCC’s view that the narrow standard could
88
lead to “anomalous, even arbitrary, results.” Significantly, the court
concluded that the “difficulty, or ‘abiding discomfort’. . . is not the
absence of ‘reasoned analysis’ on the Commission’s part, but the
89
‘vagueness . . . inherent in the subject matter.’”
The court then
moved on to a challenge of unconstitutional vagueness and,
reasoning that the Pacifica court had implicitly approved the
Commission’s indecency definition as constitutional, held itself
90
precluded from finding otherwise.
The Second Circuit, in deciding Fox Television, faced a similar
arbitrary and capricious challenge to a change in policy as the one
denied by the D.C. Circuit in Act I but came to the opposite
91
conclusion. In Fox Television, however, the court decided a narrower
question because it dealt with the comparatively slight expansion of
the broad, context-based standard already approved in Act I. The Fox
Television court’s issue was not whether indecency determinations
should be contextual, but rather, whether the Commission
adequately explained why lack of repetition would no longer be
92
deemed a dispositive factor in the contextual analysis.

85. See Act I, 852 F.2d at 1338 (finding the FCC’s explanation “adequate,” and
commenting that the FCC “rationally determined that its former policy could yield
anomalous, even arbitrary results”).
86. Id.
87. See id. (suggesting that the “thesis that only seven dirty words are properly
designated indecent” is not a correct interpretation of Pacifica).
88. See id. (commenting that the petitioner-broadcasters had disavowed the
argument that “only the seven words are properly designated indecent”).
89. Id. (quoting Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir. 1977)
(Leventhal, J., dissenting), rev’d, 438 U.S 726 (1978)).
90. Id. at 1339 (inviting correction from “Higher Authority” on the court’s
reading of Pacifica).
91. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 454 (2d Cir. 2007). In the
beginning of the Fox Television opinion, the court quotes Act I for the proposition
that “‘the agency may not resort to adjudication as a means of insulating a generic
standard from judicial review.’” Id. (quoting Act I, 852 F.2d at 1337).
92. Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 454.
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The court should have found, like the D.C. Circuit in Act I, that the
change in policy was not arbitrary and capricious, thereby moving on
93
to the constitutional challenges to the policy. First, in Act I, the FCC
offered only two generalized explanations for broadening
94
enforcement beyond Carlin’s seven filthy words. The FCC argued
that the old test was too narrow and that it allowed the broadcast of
material that may harm children as long as it did not contain certain
95
words.
In Fox Television, the FCC offered a similar, but more
thoroughly reasoned, rationale to explain the new presumption that
the “F” and “S” words were presumptively sexual or excretory
96
references needing no repetition to be considered indecent. The
FCC found that “categorically requiring repeated use of expletives,”
much like categorically requiring certain words in Act I, was
inconsistent with the context-based approach and that the single
97
factor of repetition should not “always be decisive.”
The FCC also justified the change on the grounds that allowing
98
fleeting expletives forced viewers to take the “first blow,” and would
permit broadcasters to “air expletives at all hours of the day so long as
99
they did so one at a time.” The FCC’s arguments in Fox Television,
therefore, were almost mirror images of their arguments in Act I,
focusing on the Commission’s determination that the previous policy
was anomalous and inconsistent within the contextual standard
approved by the Court in Pacifica. Given that the policy change in Act
I was considerably more expansive than the one at issue in Fox
Television, the Fox Television court should have given more deference
to the FCC and should have found its explanation adequate to defeat
the arbitrary and capricious challenge.

93. This Note argues infra Part V that the policy change was not unconstitutional
under current law.
94. See Act I, 852 F.2d at 1338 (addressing the FCC’s determination that it made
no “legal or policy sense” to regulate only certain words).
95. Id.
96. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 459–60 (discussing the FCC’s contention that it
is “difficult (if not impossible)” to tell when a swear word is used as an expletive or a
description of sexual or excretory function) (internal quotations and citation
omitted). The FCC also explained that a categorical exemption for single utterances
was inconsistent with the context-based approach and would “permit broadcasters to
air expletives at all hours of the day so long as they did so one at a time.” Id. at 460
(internal quotations and citation omitted).
97. Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 2002
and March 8, 2005 (Golden Globes Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13308 (2006),
vacated by Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007).
98. For an analysis for the “first blow” theory, see discussion infra Part IV.A.
99. Golden Globes Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13309.
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IV. OTHER SPECIFIC PROBLEMS WITH THE FOX TELEVISION COURT’S
BASES FOR FINDING THE POLICY CHANGE ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS
As discussed above, the Fox Television court should have deferred to
the FCC’s decision because the FCC offered a reasoned explanation
for the change in policy that was more extensive than the reasoning
100
behind a much larger policy change in Act I.
Instead, without
settling on a concrete basis for finding the FCC’s decision arbitrary
101
and capricious, the Fox Television court found the fatal flaw to be a
102
general failure to articulate a reasoned basis for the change.
The
court found that: (1) the “first blow” theory did not justify the
change in policy; (2) the new presumption was inconsistent with a
context-based approach; (3) the prediction that broadcasters could
air expletives all day as long as they were isolated was “divorced from
reality;” and (4) there was no evidence to suggest that a single
103
expletive was even harmful.
Issues with the court’s first two
arguments will be analyzed together and the following two in turn.
A. “First Blow” Theory and Context-Based Approach
The Fox Television court focused primarily on the Commission’s
104
proffered justification that protecting children from the “first blow”
of expletives was better accomplished by prohibiting single
105
occurrences of such words. The court concluded that the first blow
rationale was inconsistent with the context-based exceptions because

100. See discussion supra Part III.
101. The court articulated many of the common reasons for setting aside an
agency decision including a lack of rational connection between the “facts found and
the choice made,” reliance on factors that Congress did not intend to be considered,
failing to consider an important aspect of the problem and offering an explanation
counter to the evidence. Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 454–55 (quoting Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
Ultimately the court’s review simply concluded that the FCC failed “to provide a
reasoned analysis.” Id. at 462.
102. Id. at 458.
103. Id. at 459.
104. The “first blow” concept was first articulated in Pacifica as a component of the
reasoning that broadcast media are pervasive and enter into the home as intruders,
and thus, the normal duty to avert one’s attention when confronted with unwelcome
speech gives way to the need to protect children in the home from the “first blow” of
offensive content. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978) (“To say
that one may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent
language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first
blow.”).
105. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 457–58 (discussing the FCC’s “first blow” theory
as the primary reason for the agency crackdown on fleeting expletives).
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children could still be subjected to the first blow of indecent
106
language in certain circumstances.
The rationale behind the “first blow” theory advanced in Pacifica
was that requiring the listener to turn off the radio after hearing an
offensive word was like asking them to run away from an assault after
the first blow, which was unacceptable in the home and therefore
107
justified lowering First Amendment protection.
According to the
Court’s analogy, running away from the first blow does not “avoid a
108
The Court also noted that a
harm that has already taken place.”
broadcasted expletive could “enlarge[] a child’s vocabulary in an
109
instant,” thus strongly suggesting that the first “fuck” or “shit” that
slipped by before turning off the set was worth curbing First
110
Amendment protection. The theory was advanced as a way around
the criticism that one could easily turn off the offending source,
much like averting one’s eyes to objectionable content in a public
111
space. Thus, the “first blow” theory, by its nature, was designed to
112
protect against the first offensive word, which calls into question the
Fox Television court’s especially critical view of the FCC’s inclusion of
single expletives into the category of actionable speech.
The Fox Television court’s essential argument was that the “first
blow” theory, as justification for finding single expletives indecent,
was inconsistent with the FCC’s context-based standard which allows
113
114
for certain artistic and news exceptions that may make otherwise

106. See id. at 458–59 (citing, for example, the FCC’s previous exemptions for
expletives in a “bona fide news interview” and arguing that children who may not
realize why the words are “integral” would be subjected to the first blow) (internal
quotations omitted).
107. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748–50 (relating the first blow concept to nuisance
theory in the sense that it was applied to prohibit otherwise acceptable speech in the
“wrong place,” (i.e., intruding into the privacy of the home)).
108. Id. at 749.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 748–49.
111. See id. at 748–49 n.27 (distinguishing its case from Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971), on the grounds that “[o]utside the home, the balance between the
offensive speaker and the unwilling audience may sometimes tip in favor of the
speaker, requiring the listener to turn away”).
112. The Court did not, however, explicitly decide whether single utterances
could be sanctioned. See id. at 750 (“We have not decided that an occasional
expletive . . . would justify any sanction.”).
113. See, e.g., Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Regarding Their
Broadcast on November 11, 2004, of The ABC Television Network’s Presentation of
The Film Saving Private Ryan, 20 F.C.C.R. 4507, 4513 (2005) (finding expletives
during broadcast of war film not indecent because of integral nature of expletives to
historical context and artistic depiction of reality).
114. See, e.g., Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2,
2002 and March 8, 2005 (Golden Globes Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13327
(2006), vacated by Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007)
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115

indecent speech justifiable.
But in so arguing, the court
contradicted itself by attacking the fleeting expletive policy as
116
inconsistent with a context-based approach, while simultaneously
faulting the context-based exceptions as inconsistent with the primary
rationale for regulating broadcast indecency—protecting children
117
from the harm (i.e., the “first blow”) of indecent speech.
In scrutinizing this perceived discrepancy between the
Commission’s actual policy and the “first blow” theory, the court felt
that undiscriminating children, unable to differentiate appropriate
contexts from inappropriate ones, would be subject to the “first blow”
118
of offensive language in some situations but not others. As pointed
out by the dissenting judge, however, this critique applies to the
entire rationale for broadcast regulation as much as it applies to the
119
change in fleeting expletive policy.
Moreover, the FCC’s new
treatment of fleeting expletives did not guarantee that “any
occurrence of an expletive is indecent or profane,” but rather, that
120
fleeting expletives could be actionable.
The court’s critique therefore focused on the inconsistency with
which the indecency standard is applied generally, rather than the
121
inclusion of fleeting expletives as actionable. The court admitted as
much, commenting that the first blow theory “bears no rational
connection to the Commission’s actual policy regarding fleeting
122
expletives.”
Under the court’s reasoning, it seems that the “first
(reaffirming the need for a restrained approach to indecency determinations in
“news and public affairs programming”).
115. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 458–59 (rebutting the dissent’s suggestion that
the majority’s issue was with the inconsistency of the policy with the first blow theory,
while simultaneously maintaining that the rationale was “disconnected from the
actual policy implemented by the Commission”).
116. See id. at 458–59 (implying that a context-based approach to indecency
determinations is proper).
117. See id. at 458 (faulting the FCC for “chang[ing] its perception that a fleeting
expletive was not a harmful ‘first blow’ for nearly thirty years” after Pacifica).
118. Id. If the court’s argument that children do not understand the importance
of context is carried to its logical conclusion, then any context-based standard would
presumably be deemed inconsistent with the goal of protecting children from
offensive language. Id. at 459. The balance between contextual exceptions and the
need to protect children, however, is the basic balance struck by the Court in Pacifica.
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978).
119. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 471 (Leval, J., dissenting) (“If there is merit in
the majority’s argument that the Commission’s actions are arbitrary and capricious
because of irrationality in its standards . . . that argument must be directed against
the entire censorship structure.”).
120. Id. at 458 n.7 (majority opinion).
121. See id. at 458–59 (highlighting various inconsistent FCC indecency decisions);
see also Bungard, supra note 20, at 206–18 (reviewing FCC indecency decisions and
finding a “blurred distinction” between what the FCC has determined to be or not to
be indecent, resulting in chilled speech).
122. Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 458.
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123

blow” theory would bear “no rational connection” to the contextbased approach in any case because, by their nature, contextual
determinations allow children to take the first blow in certain
situations while protecting them in others.
Moreover, the FCC’s presumption that certain words are sexual or
excretory references actually decreases uncertainty and inconsistency
because it protects children from the first blow whenever it happens
124
to be the only blow.
Considering that a particular program
segment rarely includes only a single expletive—even the Nicole
125
Richie incident included several —the presumption also removes
broadcasters’ uncertainty as to how many utterances within a
particular time frame would be actionable by placing all
objectionable language on a level playing field. The court thus
faulted the FCC for failing to justify its entire indecency policy rather
than simply the shift in policy, which is more a critique of the
reasoning behind Pacifica’s holding than a critique of the FCC’s new
presumption.
B. Predictions of a Rise in Future Use of Expletives
The Fox Television court also felt that the Commission had
inaccurately predicted that expletive use would rise dramatically if
126
single occurrences were not actionable. This determination almost
certainly falls within the FCC’s area of expertise, and thus, should be
given particular deference by judges who lack the agency’s
127
expertise.
Although the FCC did not cite to any hard data
128
supporting their prediction, the increasing prevalence of expletives
123. Id.
124. See id. at 471 (Leval, J., dissenting) (arguing that the inclusion of fleeting
expletives makes the new policy more, rather than less, consistent because the
context-based analysis applies to all circumstances without a blanket exception for
isolated occurrences).
125. See Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2,
2002 and Mar. 8, 2005 (Golden Globes Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13308
(2006), vacated by Fox Television, 489 F.3d 444 (majority opinion) (suggesting that
Richie’s language would have been actionable even before the Golden Globes
decision because it included more than one offensive word).
126. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 460 (labeling the FCC’s prediction as “divorced
from reality” on the ground that broadcasters did not “barrage[] the airwaves with
expletives” before they became actionable indecency).
127. See, e.g., Cellnet Comm. Inc. v. FCC, 149 F.3d 429, 441 (6th Cir. 1998) (“It is
well-established that under the arbitrary and capricious standard of review, an
agency’s predictive judgments about areas that are within the agency’s field of
discretion and expertise are entitled to particularly deferential review.”).
128. See Golden Globes Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13309 (contending that
allowing fleeting expletives would “as a matter of logic permit broadcasters to air
expletives at all hours of the day so long as they did so one at a time”) (emphasis
added).
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on television is common enough knowledge that the prediction
should have been viewed as a policy judgment that was within the
129
Moreover, scholars have increasingly
Commission’s discretion.
highlighted the concern that broadcast competes with unregulated
speech on cable and satellite, and that by increasing racy content,
130
broadcast is better able to compete.
Given this trend, it is a
reasonable assumption on the FCC’s part that expletive use would
131
increase overall if single expletives were permitted.
C. Evidence of Harm
The Fox Television court also improperly attacked the Commission
on the ground that it did not provide any evidence to suggest that
fleeting expletives were a “problem” (i.e., harmful to children) in the
132
first place.
The court cited United States v. Playboy Entertainment
133
for the proposition that the agency must offer actual
Group
134
The difficulty with
evidence of the harm sought to be addressed.
the court’s reasoning, however, is that it drew an untenable
comparison between Playboy’s problem of signal bleed occasionally
leading to pornographic images appearing without a subscription to
adult cable channels and the problem of fleeting expletives on
135
broadcast television.
This analysis fails to consider that the signal
129. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 472 (Leval, J., dissenting) (arguing that “[a]s a
matter of law, it makes no difference” whose prediction about future expletive use is
correct and that the court is required to defer to the agency’s judgment); see also
Aurele Danoff, Comment, “Raised Eyebrows” Over Satellite Radio: Has Pacifica Met its
Match?, 34 PEPP. L. REV. 743, 776–77 (2007) (noting that broadcast is becoming more
laced with expletives and violence as broadcasters attempt to “up the ante” to
compete with “edgier” cable programming).
130. See Coates, supra note 19, at 777–78 (describing the nation’s “enduring
affection for the tawdry, tacky, and scantily-clad”); see also Rosenblat, supra note 20, at
189 (describing Howard Stern’s move from broadcast radio to satellite radio in order
to be “beyond FCC control”).
131. See Rooder, supra note 31, at 901–03 (arguing that consumers watch offensive
broadcasts even though they would prefer to have content regulated, which suggests
that the broadcast industry will continue to air offensive content under the
assumption that it is responding to market demand).
132. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 461 (majority opinion) (suggesting that children
today are exposed to expletives more often and from a wider variety of sources than
in the past and requiring evidence that children in today’s world are harmed by
fleeting expletives). Again, this argument goes more towards the justification for
regulating indecent speech at all, rather than the reasonableness of making single
expletives actionable. See generally Coates, supra note 19, at 776–78 (discussing how
the standards of decency have changed over time).
133. 529 U.S. 803 (1994).
134. Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 461.
135. On the issue of proving a problem, the court also cited Quincy Cable TV, Inc.
v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1463 (D.C. Cir. 1985), which dealt with whether the FCC had
adequately demonstrated that the government had a substantial interest in
promoting local programming by requiring cable TV providers to carry certain local
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bleed addressed in Playboy was a “phenomenon” that was not present
136
on all televisions tuned to a specific channel at a specific time.
Unlike signal bleed, fleeting expletives, when broadcast, inevitably
reach every television tuned to that particular station. A distinction
must therefore be drawn between the description of harm as
“isolated” in Playboy and in Fox Television. In Fox Television, the term
describes expletives that are spoken only once but reach every
137
television tuned to the program; in Playboy, the term connotes the
sporadic nature of the images or audio actually reaching the
138
audience.
Thus, demanding proof that broadcast expletives are
harmful is a matter of content evaluation, whereas demanding proof
that signal bleed is harmful is a matter of the prevalence and
139
frequency of admittedly harmful content.
Moreover, demanding proof of the harm to children of a single
expletive—or even the harm of multiple expletives—is inconsistent
with the theory behind broadcast regulation in general, and with the
140
“first blow” theory specifically.
The essential reason behind
Pacifica’s approval of limited regulation was that children should not
be exposed to offensive content in a pervasive and accessible medium
141
such as broadcast.
Thus, implicit in this rationale is the Supreme
Court’s acceptance of Congress’ initial determination that indecent
142
content is harmful.
Additionally, it has been said that, “Congress
broadcast channels. Id. Similarly, the court cited Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567
F.2d 9, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1997), where the FCC was challenged on a cable access issue in
which “content regulations . . . [were] not at issue.” Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 49.
Neither of these decisions is analogous to the governmental interest in protecting
children from objectionable content.
136. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 806 (noting
that technological scrambling techniques were “imprecise” and that audio or visual
portions of blocked programs “might be heard or seen”).
137. See Fox Television, 461 F.3d at 452 (characterizing the use of the word
“fucking” as “fleeting and isolated”).
138. See Playboy, 529 U.S. at 820–21 (using the word “isolate” to connote reported
incidents of children actually seeing or hearing scrambled adult programming).
139. See id. (upholding the lower court’s determination that infrequent instances
of signal bleed are insufficient to find a harm). The prevalence of a technological
anomaly is a more easily quantifiable measure of “harm” than the abstract notion of
whether expletives are harmful to children.
140. See supra discussion in Part IV.A.
141. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–50 (1978).
142. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000) (providing fines and imprisonment for utterance
of indecent language in broadcast). Although the specific harm is not easy to define
or quantify and is certainly not agreed upon, it is nevertheless an issue that Congress
sought to control with legislation. Cf. Jim Puzzanghera, Washington May Take Up TV
Violence, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2007, at C1, available at http://www.commercialalert.org
/news/archive/2007/01/washington-may-take-up-tv-violence (discussing potential
legislation to curb television violence and noting that “[o]ne proposal would give
regulators powers similar to those they have now to punish indecency and coarse
language over the airwaves”).
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does not need the testimony of psychiatrists and social scientists in
order to take note of the coarsening of impressionable minds that
can result from a persistent exposure to sexually explicit material just
143
this side of obscenity.”
Thus, the Fox Television court improperly
faulted the FCC for not providing evidence to support the
governmental concern on which the entire indecency regulatory
144
scheme is based.
D. Other Arbitrary and Capricious Considerations Not Addressed by the Fox
Television Court
In addition to the fact that the D.C. Circuit had previously found a
145
similar, but broader policy change adequately explained in Act I,
and despite the court’s overly searching examination of the FCC’s
146
rationale and evidence,
the policy change was supported by
substantial explanation and reasoned analysis advanced in multiple
147
Commission opinions. Moreover, although the Fox Television court
disagreed with the FCC’s outcome, the policy change was endorsed
148
by Congress and indirectly supported by recent legislation.
1.

The FCC justified its change in policy in anticipating judicial review
The Fox Television court’s lack of deference, on a broader level, was
unsupported by the procedural status of the case and the resulting
extensive explanation of the new policy. It is generally stated that
agency explanations are inadequate if they rely on faulty, implausible,

143. Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (Act III), 58 F.3d 654, 662 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (en banc); see also Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684
(1986) (requiring no scientific demonstration of psychic injury to determine that
government has a compelling interest in protecting children from indecent speech).
144. But see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Morals Based Justifications for Lawmaking: Before
and After Lawrence v. Texas, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1233, 1305 (2004) (examining moralsbased legislation and proposing that the Court require fact-based rationales for
government action). Because the underlying indecency legislation is in many
respects morals legislation, there is a possibility, albeit highly unlikely, that under this
type of rationale, the Court could strike it down as a factually unsupported
government interest. Id. cf. Mark Cenite, Federalizing or Eliminating Online Obscenity
Law as an Alternative to Contemporary Community Standards, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 25, 66–
69 (2004) (suggesting that laws against obscenity may be vulnerable to attack on
grounds that they are purely morals legislation). If this thesis has merit, its extension
into indecency laws would be even stronger, as indecency, unlike obscenity, is
constitutionally protected. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 462
(2d Cir. 2007) (noting “that all speech covered by the FCC’s indecency policy is fully
protected by the First Amendment”).
145. Supra discussion in Part III.C.
146. Supra discussion in Part IV.
147. Infra discussion in Part IV.D.1.
148. Infra discussion in Part V.A–B.

2008]

ARBITRARY AND F^@#S*! CAPRICIOUS

747

149

or insufficient reasoning. At the time the court heard the case, the
FCC had already reconsidered both Billboard Music Awards issues on
remand, reaffirming the fleeting expletive policy announced in the
Golden Globes decision and, again, concluding that the material was
150
actionably indecent.
Having notice that its policy would be
immediately subject to judicial review, the FCC went to great lengths
in their remand opinion to provide an explanation for its policy
151
change.
The situation is thus unlike one in which an agency either failed to
provide an explanation or made no effort to adequately support its
152
change in policy.
The court’s opinion makes broad, conclusory
statements to the effect that the FCC offered no support for its
153
decision.
In truth, however, the FCC offered many reasonable
154
explanations for the policy and the court simply refused to accept
them. At the very least, the FCC met the burden of showing that the
155
new rule effectuates the indecency statute as well as the old rule. It
is curious, then, that the court also anticipated that the Commission
would do nothing more on remand than develop a more adequate

149. E.g., Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983); JUDICIAL REVIEW, supra note 68, at 184–85.
150. See Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2,
2002 and Mar. 8, 2005 (Golden Globes Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13305, 13325
(2006), vacated by Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007).
151. Golden Globes Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13301–28. The FCC went so far as
to justify their general authority to implement a regulatory scheme against
constitutional attack. Id. at 13317–21. This treatment surely should be seen as a
reasoned analysis, as their authority and policy is currently valid under Pacifica, and
will remain so until a court finds that they have overstepped their First Amendment
bounds. See infra discussion in Part V. Under the current law, however, no such
lengthy explanation was even needed as an agency is free to modify policies at their
discretion within the bounds of their authority which has not changed since Pacifica.
See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) (“We have not decided that an
occasional expletive . . . would justify a sanction . . . [because] [t]he Commission’s
decision rested entirely on a nuisance rationale under which context is allimportant.”).
152. See Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (Act I), 852 F.2d 1332, 1341 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (criticizing the FCC for “ventur[ing] no explanation” why it considered
children aged 12–17 the relevant group in need of protection from indecent
content), overruled in part by Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (Act III), 58 F.3d
654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
153. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 460 (2d Cir. 2007)
(labeling the FCC’s prediction of a future increase in expletives without regulation
“divorced from reality”).
154. E.g., Golden Globes Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13308 (explaining that
“categorically requiring repeated use of expletives . . . is inconsistent with . . . the
critical nature of context”).
155. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 457 (referencing the standard announced in
N.Y. Council, Ass’n of Civilian Technicians v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 757 F.2d 502,
508 (2d Cir. 1985)).

748

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:723

156

explanation.
Considering that the Commission convincingly tied
the policy change to essentially every available justification for
broadcast indecency regulation, one is left to wonder what, if any,
reasoned analysis it could have offered that would have been
satisfactory to the court.
Finally, one of the major arguments against overly searching
judicial review of agency decisions is that it forces agencies to devote
157
greater resources to defending their policy changes in advance.
The effect of the Fox Television decision was to vacate and remand an
already-remanded and extensively supported policy change for yet
158
another round of rationalization.
Further, the decision left both
the FCC and broadcasters unsure of exactly what policy the FCC
159
would or could implement with regard to fleeting expletives. This
is particularly true because the FCC is still being urged by Congress to
continue sanctioning fleeting expletives, while the Second Circuit is
requiring additional, yet unspecified justifications for them to do
160
so.
2.

The FCC’s policy was supported by Congress and consistent with current
law
The FCC, in modifying its policy, was acting pursuant to the
express wishes of Congress, which issued resolutions urging the
161
continuance of the heightened fleeting expletive policy. However,
156. See id. at 462 (predicting that on remand the FCC would provide a reasoned
explanation for the change in policy, but suggesting that such an explanation would
not pass “constitutional muster”).
157. See Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process,
41 DUKE L. J. 1385, 1412 (1992)(discussing scholars’ claims that judicial review causes
agencies to go to considerable lengths to create rulemaking records that respond to
all conceivable objections).
158. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 462 (remanding the issue to the FCC for
reconsideration).
159. See generally RICHARD J. PIERCE JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 401–03
(4th ed. 2004) (criticizing the private and agency uncertainty that results from overlysearching judicial review of agency action with no clear guidance on what would cure
the defect).
160. This arguably leaves broadcasters less certain of what they may permissibly air
than before the decision was handed down, and thus solves very little. Compare Press
Release, FCC, Commissioner Copps Disappointed in Court Decision on Indecency
Complaints (June 4, 2002), available at http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attach
match/DOC-273599A1.pdf (responding to Fox Television by suggesting that “any
broadcaster who sees this decision as a green light to send more gratuitous sex and
violence into our homes would be making a huge mistake”), with Stephen Labaton,
Court Rebuffs FCC on Fines for Indecency, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/05/business/media/05decency.html?hp (noting
industry speculation that the Fox Television court’s decision could “gut the ability of
the commission to regulate any speech on television or radio”).
161. See H.R. Res. 500, 108th Cong. (2004) (“Expressing the sense of the House of
Representatives that the Federal Communications Commission should vigorously
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because the FCC did not cite congressional support as a specific
justification for the change in policy, it could not be directly
considered as part of the agency’s reasoning behind the policy
162
change.
Nevertheless, congressional support for the change is a
strong argument that should at least have been supportive of the
163
Commission’s decision.
Additionally, one of the factors relevant under arbitrary and
capricious review is whether the agency has “relied on factors which
164
Congress has not intended it to consider.”
It should have
counseled the court to some measure that both houses of Congress
had issued resolutions urging the FCC to continue its policy of
165
sanctioning indecent speech.
It can hardly be arbitrary and
capricious agency action when an agency acts pursuant to the
demands of Congress, even when those demands are not formally
166
adopted as law.
Indeed, slightly over one month after the Fox
enforce indecency and profanity laws pursuant to the intent of Congress . . . .”); S.
Res. 283, 108th Cong. (2003) (“Affirming the need to protect children in the United
States from indecent programming.”). Although enacted after the FCC’s decisions
in the Billboard Music Awards incidents at issue in Fox Television, the Broadcast
Decency Enforcement Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–235, 120 Stat. 491 (2006), raised
the maximum fine for indecency violations from $10,000 per violation with a
maximum of $75,000 to $325,000 for each violation with a maximum of $3,000,000
for any “single act or failure to act”).
162. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm. Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (“The reviewing court should not attempt itself to make up for such
deficiencies; we may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the
agency itself has not given.” (citing SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196
(1947))).
163. The major arguments against increased enforcement and regulation of
broadcast focus on the means by which the government’s interest in protecting
children is effectuated—namely that parents, rather than the FCC should be
responsible for the broadcast content to which their children are exposed. See, e.g.,
Terasa Chidester, What the #$ Is Happening on Television? Indecency In Broadcasting, 13
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 135, 162 (2004) (summarizing arguments in favor of
increased parental responsibility and decreased regulation). Given that the Supreme
Court has not revisited Pacifica, however, increased FCC regulation has not yet been
ruled out as the least restrictive, narrowly tailored means of achieving that goal. Id.
at 163. Therefore, the FCC is currently entitled to assume the constitutionality of the
urgings of Congress. See Erik Forde Ugland, Cable Television, New Technologies and the
First Amendment After Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 60 MO. L. REV. 799,
817–18 n.123 (1995) (“Because Congress has already spelled out the interests that
justify its supervision of the broadcasting industry, and because the Supreme Court
has already upheld the constitutionality of that system, individual regulations are, in
effect, presumptively constitutional.”).
164. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43.
165. E.g., H.R. Res. 500, 108th Cong. (2004); S. Res. 283, 108th Cong. (2003).
166. Congressional acquiescence to an agency interpretation can create a
presumption in favor of the interpretation. See Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv.
Comm’n of City of New York, 463 U.S. 582, 621 (1983)(“A contemporaneous and
consistent construction of a statute by those charged with its enforcement combined
with congressional acquiescence creates a presumption in favor of the administrative
interpretation, to which we should give great weight.” (citing Costanzo v. Tillinghast,
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Television court issued its decision, a bill was introduced in Congress
167
This bill would amend
to explicitly overrule the court’s decision.
the FCC’s statutory authority to include a provision that a single word
168
or image may constitute indecent programming.
Considering
recent congressional willingness to dramatically increase the amount
169
a broadcaster may be fined for indecency, it is likely that the new
170
bill will pass. If the bill does become law, the only potential ground
for attacking the FCC’s enforcement of the fleeting expletive policy
171
will be a constitutional one.
Nevertheless, as the law currently stands, the FCC’s indecency
policy is constitutional, and the fleeting expletive policy did not
172
change that fact.
Although the Pacifica Court did not directly
approve sanctions for fleeting expletives, it also did not expressly
173
foreclose the possibility. Instead, the Court approved a contextual
174
approach for determining when the “pig has entered the parlor,”
175
which is consistent with the FCC’s approach to fleeting expletives.
287 U.S. 341, 345 (1932))). Here the argument is even stronger because Congress
did not acquiesce to the FCC’s interpretation, but rather, proactively supported it.
167. Protecting Children from Indecent Programming Act, S. 1780, 110th Cong.
(2007).
168. Id. The text of the amendment would read: “In administering the
regulations promulgated under subsection (a), the Commission shall maintain a
policy that a single word or image may constitute indecent programming.” Id.
169. See Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–235, 120
Stat. 491 (2006) (increasing maximum fines for indecency, obscenity and profanity
violations).
170. But see Krotoszynski, supra note 8, at 2119 (“If the Commission regularly
attempted to assess fines and forfeitures sufficient to deter undesirable conduct by
licensees, the commercial broadcasting community’s congressional allies would
undoubtedly come to the industry’s rescue.”).
171. See Sophia Cope, Bill Could Hasten Demise of FCC Indecency Regulation, Center
For Democracy & Technology, July 17, 2007, http://blog.cdt.org/2007/07/17/billcould-hasten-demise-of-fcc-indecency-regulation/ (discussing the implications of the
Protecting Children from Indecent Programming Act and concluding that, if passed,
it would necessitate a constitutional evaluation of regulation of fleeting expletives).
172. See infra discussion in Part V.
173. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750 (1978) (comparing Carlin
monologue to a “two-way radio conversation between a cab driver and a dispatcher,
or a telecast of an Elizabethan comedy” and cautioning that the Court had not
decided that “an occasional expletive in either setting would justify any sanction”).
174. Id. (analogizing to the law of nuisance to the extent that the contextual
approach can simply mean the “‘right thing in the wrong place’” (quoting Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926))).
175. Despite a presumption that certain words are sexual or excretory references
(which places them within the first prong of indecency analysis), the FCC’s test is still
contextual with respect to whether the words are patently offensive under
contemporary community standards. See Complaints Regarding Various Television
Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 2002 and Mar. 8, 2005 (Omnibus Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 2664,
2668 (2006) (describing indecency analysis as a balancing test and “contextual
analysis”), modified by Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between
Feb. 2, 2002 and Mar. 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299 (2006). The effect of the policy
change is merely that lack of repetition is no longer a dispositive factor in the
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Making single utterances of expletives actionable is also consistent
with the theories behind Pacifica. Most notably, fining fleeting
expletives is consistent with the “first blow” theory advanced by the
176
Pacifica Court, and thus, unless Pacifica is revisited, the FCC’s
contextual approach will remain constitutional.
E. Summary of Arbitrary & Capricious Review
The essential error of the Fox Television court was that it failed to
give deference to the FCC’s interpretation of its mandate, and
cloaked an attack on the FCC’s entire indecency regime in a non177
deferential critique of the agency’s reasoning. Although the court
178
the decision is more
gave lip service to due deference,
appropriately viewed as a court disagreeing with an agency
determination on an arguable interpretation of the governing
179
180
statute, something both Chevron and Motor Vehicle Manufacturers
Association of the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
181
Insurance Co. condemn. Although there was nothing actually
impermissible about the way the Fox Television court decided the case,
the court went to great lengths to find an inadequate explanation for
the FCC’s change of policy, which approached the outer limits of
judicial ability to discount deference to an agency’s policy
182
As demonstrated by this analysis, the court’s
determinations.
extension of its power of review was a result of finding problems not

determination of patent offensiveness under contemporary community standards for
the broadcast medium. See id. at 13309 (reiterating that “‘even relatively fleeting
references may be found indecent’ if the context makes them patently offensive”
(quoting Industry Guidance on Commission’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464 and Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency (2001 Enforcement
Policies), 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 8009 (2001))).
176. See supra discussion in Part IV.A.
177. See supra discussion in Part IV.
178. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 456 (2007) (“An initial
agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone.” (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 863 (1984))) (internal quotation
omitted).
179. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 473 (Leval, J., dissenting) (“What we have is at
most a difference of opinion between a court and an agency . . . in matters within the
agency’s competence . . . .”).
180. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 (arguing that politically unaccountable federal
judges have a duty to defer to the judgments of agencies in which Congress delegates
responsibility for policy decisions).
181. Motor Vehicle Manuf. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983) (cautioning courts not to substitute their judgment for that of the
agencies’ under arbitrary and capricious review).
182. See supra discussion in Part III.A (reviewing the debate over the proper level
of deference in judicial review).
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with the change in policy, but with the justifications for broadcast
regulation generally.
V. THE FOX TELEVISION COURT’S CONSTITUTIONAL DICTA
After holding that the FCC’s fleeting expletive policy was arbitrary
and capricious, the Fox Television court predicted that the “fleeting
expletive regime” would not withstand constitutional scrutiny because
of concerns of vagueness, overbreadth and the erosion of
183
justifications for broadcast’s unique First Amendment treatment.
This prediction was inaccurate because, much like the court’s
arbitrariness analysis, it focused on problems applicable to indecency
regulation generally and not to constitutional issues specific to the
184
fleeting expletive policy.
Nevertheless, the court’s prediction gave
the first major show of support to many of the arguments made by
broadcasters and commentators as to why the broadcast regulatory
185
regime as a whole is unconstitutional, but failed to convincingly
argue that the change in policy was even a part of the reason for its
186
The court’s essential arguments concerning
unconstitutionality.
vagueness, overbreadth, technological advances and spectrum
scarcity will be discussed in turn.

183. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 462–68. The court addressed the constitutional
issues only after suggesting that the FCC would be capable of adequately justifying its
new stance on remand and that it would therefore continue to implement the policy.
See id. at 462. It is questionable that the FCC could provide an explanation sufficient
for the Fox Television court considering the extremely high level of review and the
already extensive justification proffered by the Commission. See discussion supra
Parts III–IV.
184. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 463 (illustrating vagueness and over breadth
with reference to FCC decisions). All of the FCC decisions cited by the court,
however, involved the use of multiple expletives, and so, would have been actionable
even before the Golden Globes change. See id. (discussing the airing of numerous
expletives during the movie Saving Private Ryan as not indecent, while repeated
expletives during a different broadcast were indecent); see also Complaints Regarding
Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 2002 and Mar. 8, 2005 (Golden Globes
Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13307–08 (2006) (finding that Nicole Richie’s use
of two expletives during the 2003 Billboard Music Awards qualified as repeated and
deliberate), vacated by Fox Television, 489 F.3d 444.
185. See Robert Corn-Revere, Ronald G. London & Amber Husbands, Second
Circuit Rejects FCC’s “Fleeting Expletives” Policy; Questions Indecency Regime
(June 2007), http://www.dwt.com/practc/communications/bulletins/06-07_Indec
ency.htm (suggesting that the Fox Television decision “called into serious question the
ongoing constitutionality of the FCC’s enforcement regime as presently
formulated”).
186. See infra discussion in Parts V.A and V.B (dissecting the court’s constitutional
analysis and its focus on vagueness of definition and developments in technology
rather than policy change).
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A. Vagueness & Overbreadth
The court’s primary constitutional concern was that the indecency
definition is unconstitutionally vague in that it “fails to provide the
clarity required by the Constitution” and overly broad because it
“creates an undue chilling effect on free speech and requires
broadcasters to ‘steer far wider of the unlawful zone’” by censoring
187
legitimate, protected speech.
This argument has been made
188
extensively by commentators and has validity when applied to the
189
context-based approach generally. However, it is less applicable to
fleeting expletives because specifically delineating certain words as
190
actionable more closely approaches the “narrow specificity”
required in First Amendment regulation of speech.
Many critics of the indecency standard argue that it is a vague and
overly broad regulation that leads to unnecessary self-censorship
191
beyond the proscribed speech. This argument is not novel, and was
actually dismissed by the Pacifica Court when it noted that “[t]here
are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less
192
offensive language.”
Moreover, given that the First Amendment
seeks to protect the exchange of ideas by exposing them to public
193
scrutiny, it seems logical that the most legitimate use of expletives
would be for the purpose of discussing and exposing their taboo
place in society. This examination of expletives as expletives is exactly

187. Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 463 (citing Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526
(1958)).
188. See, e.g., Bungard, supra note 20, at 194 (labeling the indecency standard an
“applause test” and contending that the current test can be salvaged if consistently
applied); Coates, supra note 19, at 789–97 (arguing that the FCC’s indecency test is
vague and leads to broadcaster self-censorship); Nason Shefterl-Gomes, Your
Revolution: The Federal Communications Commission, Obscenity and the Chilling of Artistic
Expression on Radio Airwaves, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 191, 212–14 (2006)
(discussing broadcasters broad preventative self-censorship in response to lack of
guidance).
189. But see Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1262 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (suggesting that, although the FCC’s policy may cause self-censorship,
broadcasters have the remedy of getting a “trial on the merits” of specific forfeitures
in federal court and have thus far been unable to show that “the agency is forcing off
the air material that is not indecent”); Danoff, supra note 129, at 780 (predicting that
the Court will continue to rely on Pacifica’s emphasis on case-by-case determinations
of indecency in order to overcome vagueness challenges).
190. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
191. See, e.g., Rooder, supra note 31, at 898–902 (suggesting that the over-breadth
of the indecency test coupled with increased fines leads to self-censorship).
192. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 n.18 (1978) (responding to
broadcaster’s arguments that the FCC’s indecency definition “may lead some
broadcasters to censor themselves”).
193. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 753
(2d ed. 1997).
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what George Carlin attempted to do in his monologue and exactly
195
Thus,
what the Pacifica court held may legitimately be censored.
the Court has implicitly decided that the use of expletives—even as
political commentary on expletives—may not be worthy of extensive
196
First Amendment protection.
It also must be remembered that self-censorship is at the heart of
197
the Pacifica doctrine, and that the Court has thus far been willing to
tolerate censorship that lies at “the periphery of First Amendment
198
The language at issue in the fleeting expletives cases is
concern.”
199
exactly the type of language to which the Court was referring
because, in the Court’s words, avoiding indecent language “will have
its primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious
200
communication.”
Therefore, although the indecency test may be
problematic with respect to more complex determinations, when it
comes to merely offensive language—a concept simple to grasp but
difficult to define—a policy allowing fines for single expletives
reduces constitutional problems with vagueness and overbreadth
because broadcasters are on explicit notice that any use of certain
201
words may be indecent.
Once the assumption is made that certain words are presumptively
indecent, broadcasters need only decide if the word is nevertheless
justified as “demonstrably essential to the nature of an artistic or
educational work or essential to informing viewers on a matter of
202
Although this is by no means a black and
public importance.”
194. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 730 (noting that Carlin, as a social satirist, was seeking
to use “words to satirize as harmless and essentially silly our attitudes towards those
words”).
195. See id. at 750–51 (holding that the FCC’s power to regulate does not require a
finding of obscenity).
196. See id. at 747 (reasoning that the social value of speech varies with the
circumstances).
197. Because the FCC cannot prohibit indecent language before it airs—which
would be a prior restraint—it relies exclusively on deterrence through the threat of
fines to deliberately induce self-censorship. See id. at 736 (noting that the FCC may
not subject “broadcast matter to scrutiny prior to its release”).
198. Id. at 743.
199. See id. at 746 (“‘Such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of
ideas and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be
derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.’” (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942))).
200. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 744 n.18.
201. See Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing
of the “Golden Globe Awards” Program (Golden Globes Complaint), 19 F.C.C.R. 4975,
4978 (2004) (placing broadcasters on notice that any variation of the “F-Word” is
inherently sexual thus meeting the first prong of the indecency definition as
describing or depicting sexual or excretory activities).
202. Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 2002
and Mar. 8, 2005 (Omnibus Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 2664, 2669 (2006) (discussing
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203

white determination,
it is no more vague than contextually
evaluating other forms of potential indecency to determine if they
204
Moreover, the Commission’s decisions
are patently offensive.
provide a reasonably good sense of the situations in which the artistic
205
or educational exceptions will apply. Thus, the determination that
fleeting expletives are actionable does nothing to exacerbate the
inherent vagueness and overbreadth of the FCC’s general contextbased approach, and instead, places all potentially indecent speech
206
on the same level.
In short, although vagueness and overbreadth

exceptions to the presumption that the “S-word” and “F-word” are profane), modified
by Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2, 2002 and
Mar. 8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 13299 (2006). The same exceptions also militate against a
finding of indecency because they suggest that the word is not patently offensive
under contemporary standards for the broadcast medium. See id. (explaining why
expletives in broadcast of Saving Private Ryan were not considered indecent or
profane). Admittedly the argument could be made that, while the presumption
reduces vagueness, over-breadth remains because broadcasters might not air words
that would actually have been acceptable in the circumstances.
203. It seems probable that the more fleeting the expletive, the less likely that it
will be integral to any artistic message because single expletives are more shocking
than those repeated at length. See Omnibus Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 2691 (finding Cher’s
use of the “F-word” in the Golden Globes to be “shocking and gratuitous” and
implying that the word could have been blocked (i.e. bleeped) “without
disproportionately disrupting the speaker’s message”).
204. The only additional chilling effect that could possibly result from this
determination with regard to fleeting expletives would be that a broadcaster chooses
not to air a specific word because of concern about whether the contextual
exceptions would apply. As noted, any such errors would result in only the single,
potentially offensive word being censored which almost certainly “lie[s] at the
periphery of First Amendment concern.” Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 730. But see Katherine
A. Fallow, The Big Chill, Congress and the FCC Crack Down on Indecency, 22 COMM. LAW.
1, 29 (2004) (predicting, in reference to the fleeting expletive policy, that “the
uncertainty surrounding the FCC’s standard will almost certainly deter broadcasters
from airing programs containing any of the ‘seven dirty words,’ even if they form an
integral part of important political, social, or artistic speech”). The weakness of this
prediction lies in its assumption that broadcasters would choose not airing the entire
program over bleeping a single word.
205. Compare Omnibus Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 2687–90 (finding multiple variations of
the word “shit” to be indecent in the broadcast of a fictional account of a 1971
skyjacker), with Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2,
2002 and Mar. 8, 2005 (Golden Globes Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13326–28
(2006) (finding that interviewee’s use of “bullshitter” on the Today Show was not
indecent because it occurred during a news interview), vacated by Fox Television
Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007). But see Fallow, supra note 204, at
28–29 (examining FCC indecency decisions and noting problems in applying the
FCC’s contextual test and confusion over where the line should be drawn).
206. Although it is conceivable that situations could arise where broadcasters
censor material that ultimately would have been appropriate in context, such
speculation is not likely grounds for overturning a regulation. See Hill v. Colorado,
530 U.S. 703, 733 (2000) (“Speculation about possible vagueness in hypothetical
situations not before the Court will not support a facial attack on a statute when it is
surely valid ‘in the vast majority of its intended applications.’” (citing United States v.
Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 23 (1960))).
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are problems, they are not problems stemming from sanctioning
fleeting expletives.
B. Changes in Technology, Erosion of Uniqueness, and
Less Restrictive Means
The second major constitutional argument advanced by the Fox
Television court was that, due to increasing prevalence of cable,
207
satellite, Internet and other media, broadcast is no longer unique
and therefore its regulations deserve the same First Amendment
208
209
scrutiny as restrictions on non-broadcast media. This argument is
essentially a critique of the scarcity rationale that still underlies all
broadcast regulation—the idea that broadcast may be regulated
because there are more people who want to broadcast than there are
210
available frequencies.
Although this is a potentially valid
211
argument, it is causally unrelated to fleeting expletives and is

207. See, e.g., Chidester, supra note 163, at 166 (suggesting that “[t]he fact that so
many Americans have access to cable” makes “maintenance of two different
standards . . . outdated”); Rooder, supra note 31, at 895–97 (summarizing arguments
that broadcast is no longer “readily distinguishable from other media on the grounds
of pervasiveness”).
208. The Fox Television court did not explicitly call for strict scrutiny in broadcast
speech restrictions, but, according to industry lawyers, intimated that “strict scrutiny
may soon apply to broadcasting.” See Robert Corn-Revere, Ronald G. London &
Amber Husbands, Second Circuit Rejects FCC’s “Fleeting Expletives” Policy;
Questions Indecency Regime (June 2007), http://www.dwt.com/practc/communi
cations/bulletins/06-07_Indecency.htm.
209. See Fox Television, 489 U.S. at 464–65 (commenting that, although the media
landscape has changed, broadcast has historically had and continues to have less First
Amendment protection); see also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637
(1994) (holding that the rationales for applying less rigorous scrutiny to broadcast
do not apply to cable); cf. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (applying strict
scrutiny to Internet regulations).
210. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 388 (1969) (allowing the
government to regulate broadcast licenses in order to facilitate communication by
preventing overcrowding of broadcast spectrum). Scholars and broadcasters have
debated the validity of the scarcity rationale since its inception and current
technological changes are fueling the debate. See, e.g., Josephine Soriano, Note, The
Digital Transition and The First Amendment: Is It Time To Reevaluate Red Lion’s Scarcity
Rationale, 15 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 341, 355–56 (2006) (surveying the scarcity rationale
and suggesting that “the time is ripe” for it to be reconsidered); Varona, supra note
10, at 57–64 (discussing the continuing validity of the scarcity rationale for broadcast
regulation).
211. See Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1263 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (Edwards, C.J., concurring) (suggesting that indecency regulation law is in a
“state of disarray” and questioning the distinction between broadcast and cable
television given cable’s responsibility for a significant amount of indecency on
television). But see Varona, supra note 9, at 167 (discussing the scarcity rationale and
arguing that “new technologies have done nothing to lessen the persistent scarcity in
broadcast frequencies available for license”).
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equally applicable to the FCC’s policy before single words became
212
actionable.
The court also argued that targeted blocking technology such as
213
the V-Chip
is a less restrictive means, as compared to FCC
214
The court thus suggested that
regulation of protecting children.
the Commission’s active regulatory role may no longer be narrowly
215
tailored to achieve the government’s goals of protecting children.
This argument has also been extensively studied by scholars and has
216
The trouble with these arguments, however, is
significant merit.
that they posit less restrictive means (e.g. the V-Chip) for achieving
the government’s objectives only after building on the erosion of
217
uniqueness and scarcity to heighten the level of scrutiny.
Therefore, in order for the Court to accept the targeted blocking
argument, it would have to first dispense with or dilute both the
scarcity rationale and Pacifica’s articulation of the uniqueness of
broadcast so that FCC regulations could be analyzed under
heightened scrutiny. When viewed in this light, the Fox Television
court’s argument goes too far for its purpose and could theoretically

212. The arguments regarding uniqueness and scarcity go toward the FCC’s ability
to regulate broadcast rather than the specific regulations imposed under that
authority. See Sophia Cope, Center For Democracy & Technology, Bill Could Hasten
Demise of FCC Indecency Regulation (July 17, 2007), http://blog.cdt.org/2007/
07/17/bill-could-hasten-demise-of-fcc-indecency-regulation/ (“[T]he time is coming
when the constitutional question will not be ‘to what degree may the FCC regulate
indecent speech?’ but rather, ‘can the FCC regulate indecent speech at all?’”). The
Fox Television court’s technology and scarcity dicta lean toward the latter, while the
issue of fleeting expletives is clearly the former.
213. See Federal Communications Commission, V-Chip: Viewing Television
Responsibly, http://www.fcc.gov/vchip/ (last visited Nov. 27, 2007) (explaining that
the V-Chip, in combination with program ratings, “permit[s] parents to block
programming with a certain rating from coming into their home”). The V-Chip
became mandatory in all televisions over thirteen inches manufactured after Jan. 1,
2000. Id.
214. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 464 (comparing recent Supreme Court cases
striking down cable and Internet speech regulations because less restrictive means
(i.e., targeted blocking) were available to protect children).
215. See id. (contrasting scrutiny of restrictions inside and outside of the context of
broadcast media).
216. See Rooder, supra note 31, at 874–81 (discussing First Amendment standards
for indecency applied to non-broadcast media such as telephone, cable television
and the internet and finding that less restrictive means made restrictions on speech
outside of broadcast unconstitutional); Joshua B. Gordon, Note, Pacifica Is Dead.
Long Live Pacifica: Formulating a New Argument Structure to Preserve Government
Regulation of Indecent Broadcasts, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451, 1480–83 (2006) (detailing
technological attacks on Pacifica’s uniqueness rationales and concluding that cable
and broadcast are indistinguishable in First Amendment terms and that V-chip
technology is a less restrictive alternative to content regulation).
217. See generally Chidester, supra note 163, at 158–66 (discussing the merits of
technological advances and increased regulation as ways to curb indecent material in
broadcast).
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strip the government of its long-standing justifications for regulating
218
This would be an immensely
broadcast in any capacity.
disproportionate step taken to protect occasional fleeting expletives
under the First Amendment.
Furthermore, the technology as less restrictive means argument is
currently less applicable to fleeting expletives than to other forms of
indecency because the V-Chip technology relies on program ratings
219
that may or may not take expletives into account. Thus, while a VChip may be able to accurately screen for programs with excessive
sexual content, its effectiveness is limited with respect to fleeting and
220
often unpredictable expletives.
Although an argument could be
made that targeted blocking is a less restrictive means of protecting
children from, for example, violent content, technology has not
progressed to the point where parents can selectively block indecent
221
language.
Therefore, the only currently effective place in the broadcast
stream to intercept fleeting expletives is before they air and a
relatively short delay in live broadcasts can essentially guarantee that

218. Once the scarcity and uniqueness arguments are set aside, the only basis
arguably left for regulating broadcast is pervasiveness, which, would be a difficult
argument to make in the face of the increasing pervasiveness of cable, satellite and
Internet. See, e.g., Danoff, supra note 129, at 781 (distinguishing between the
pervasiveness of the medium and the programming and claiming that pervasiveness
of programming is a “powerful” argument for “extending Pacifica to cable and
satellite radio”).
219. See Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2,
2002 and Mar. 8, 2005 (Golden Globes Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13319–20
(2006) (noting that the V-chip depends on program ratings which are often
inaccurate and observing that most televisions do not have a V-chip and parents do
not know how to use them), vacated by Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 444. See generally
Adam Thierer, Why Regulate Broadcast? Toward a Consistent First Amendment Standard
For the Information Age, 15 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 431, 472–73 (2007) (explaining the
V-chip and claiming that the low usage rates should not be used as an “excuse for
government regulation of television programming”).
220. See Golden Globes Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13319–20.
221. But see Thierer, supra note 219, at 473–82 (surveying technological,
educational and lobbying alternatives to FCC broadcast regulation and concluding
that regulation is no longer justified in light of these workable, but imperfect,
alternatives); Gordon, supra note 216, at 1480–83 (positing that technology such as
the V-chip and rating systems are a less restrictive alternative for protecting children
from indecency at the household level rather than by government regulation). It is
likely, however, that in the near future blocking technology will progress to the point
where it does become a less restrictive means of protecting children from indecent
speech. See, e.g., TVGuardian, The Foul Language Filter Homepage, http://tvguard
ian.com/gshell.php (last visited Nov. 18, 2007) (exclaiming that “TVGuardian is a
patented, award winning technology that automatically mutes offensive language”).
This could conceivably give the Court all it needs to strike down or reduce the FCC’s
regulatory role without actually abandoning the justifications for reduced scrutiny.
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expletives do not slip by in inappropriate circumstances. Given that
there is still a general consensus that the goal of protecting children
223
from indecent speech is valid, placing the responsibility for content
control in broadcasters still represents the least restrictive method of
224
accomplishing this objective.
In sum, fining broadcasters for
fleeting expletives does not contribute anything to the validity of the
arguments that broadcast is no longer unique or scarce and fleeting
expletives are currently not controllable by less restrictive means than
FCC regulation.
CONCLUSION
Beginning in 1978 with FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the FCC has
225
been a gatekeeper of sorts for the content of broadcast media.
226
What began as the regulation of a “verbal shock treatment” of
expletives by a comedian has resulted in the FCC taking responsibility
for policing speech on the airwaves within the bounds of the First
227
Amendment.
There are many increasingly viable arguments,
however, that Pacifica’s justifications for the permissibility of
broadcast censorship are no longer valid. In that context, a pitched
battle is brewing between the FCC and broadcasters who assert that
228
regulation of broadcast is no longer justifiable.
Meanwhile, the FCC, with apparent support from Congress, has
decided to once again expand its enforcement capacity, ruling that

222. See Golden Globes Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13311–14 (recognizing that
bleeping expletives is not foolproof, but contending that a five second delay should
be sufficient to stop unwanted expletives without changing the live quality of
broadcast). But see Corn-Revere, supra note 17, at 265 (claiming that the
government’s interest in “substituting itself for informed and empowered parents . . .
is not sufficiently compelling” because it incorrectly assumes that parents are not
capable or interested enough to monitor what their children are watching (quoting
United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, 529 U.S. 803, 825 (2000))).
223. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (“[W]e have repeatedly
recognized the governmental interest in protecting children from harmful
materials.”); Rooder, supra note 31, at 903 (arguing that the Pacifica Court’s
“‘protection of children’ rationale is still compelling”). But see Danoff, supra note
129, at 776–78 (2007) (claiming that concern for children’s exposure to
objectionable broadcast content may be “overly-inflated,” but noting that it is still a
“legitimate government interest”).
224. But see Corn-Revere, supra note 17, at 265 (implying that targeted blocking
technology is the least restrictive means of achieving the government’s interest in
protecting children).
225. See supra discussion in Part I.
226. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 756 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
227. See supra discussion in Part I.
228. See supra Part V and accompanying notes.
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single or “fleeting” expletives are actionable indecency.
The
affected broadcasters challenged the policy and the Second Circuit
agreed with them, finding it to be arbitrary and capricious under the
230
Administrative Procedure Act.
Although the arbitrary and capricious standard is applied with a
high degree of variability, the Fox Television court went too far and
substituted its judgment for the FCC’s, and in doing so, attacked the
231
entire justification behind broadcast regulation.
Further, by
remanding the issue to the FCC, the court only caused increased
uncertainty for both the FCC and broadcasters about the proper
232
scope of the FCC’s power to regulate broadcast speech.
The Fox Television court also predicted that the new policy was
unconstitutional without finding that the fleeting expletive policy had
233
in any way contributed to the unconstitutionality.
Moreover, the
court’s constitutional predictions, if carried to their logical
conclusions, could mean the demise of the rationale behind all
broadcast regulation for the minimal gain of protecting the low First
Amendment priority of fleeting expletives. Because the fleeting
expletive policy is within the limits of the FCC’s authority under
234
current law, it cannot be struck down on constitutional grounds
unless the Supreme Court chooses to reevaluate Pacifica and the
FCC’s broader authority to implement context-based speech
235
restrictions.
236
Despite the many reasons why Pacifica may no longer be valid,
there are no compelling arguments as to why the airing of a single
expletive should receive more First Amendment protection than the
airing of several. The first blow rationale advanced in Pacifica is just
as, if not more, applicable to fleeting expletives than to repeated
237
ones. Moreover, the battle over broadcast regulation should focus
on more pressing and genuine concerns than whether a broadcaster
may be fined because only a single expletive slipped by a bleeper who
fell asleep at the wheel. Therefore, if Fox Television is appealed, the

229. See Complaints Regarding Various Television Broadcasts Between Feb. 2,
2002 and Mar. 8, 2005 (Golden Globes Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13299, 13308
(2006), vacated by Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444 (2d Cir. 2007).
230. See Fox Television, 489 F.3d at 462.
231. See supra discussion in Parts III–IV.
232. See supra discussion in Part IV.
233. See supra discussion in Part V.
234. But see Chidester, supra note 163, at 167 (arguing that “targeting certain
words as indecent” is an unconstitutional prior restraint on free speech).
235. See supra discussion in Parts IV–V.
236. See supra discussion in Part V.
237. See supra discussion in Part IV.A.
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Supreme Court should reverse the Second Circuit, find the fleeting
expletive policy constitutional, and wait for a more legitimate context
238
in which to reform the general indecency regulatory scheme.

238. Such a challenge seems most likely if technology could effectively and
selectively block unwanted content. Additionally, because the free and public nature
of broadcast is one of the last remaining impediments to consistent regulatory
treatment across media, the Internet, with its similarly high level of accessibility will
probably represent the closest analogy once access to Internet connection reaches
levels comparable to television access. An interesting challenge could arise in a
situation where an identical television show is broadcast on television and
simultaneously streamed live over the Internet. In theory, the Internet version could
contain content presently deemed unacceptable for television, but with similar
pervasiveness and accessibility by children.

